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When Sovereignties May Collide - Sovereignties and the
Regulation of Business in Relation to Intellectual Property: A
Canadian Perspective
W.L. Hayhurst, Q.C.*
The forces of supranational communities have merely economic reason on their side: ranged against these are heart and home.
H.G. Gates in The Economist,
September 11, 1993
Increased prosperity lets us pursue Canadian social and cultural policies appropriate to our own conceptions, values and needs. That is the
essence of sovereignty - being able to do as we want to do.
Rt. Hon. Joe Clark on
Canadian trade negotiations
December 15, 1985
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THE LOGICALITY OF INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

The term "intellectual property" is used to include rights accorded
by patents or registrations for inventions and industrial designs, and
rights accorded by copyrights in a variety of works including literary,
dramatic, musical and artistic works. The term also includes rights in
trademarks, trade names, trade secrets, rights to restrain unfair competition, and rights accorded by some countries in appellations of origin,
integrated circuit topographies, utility models and plants. In theory
these intangible rights should, if justified at all, transcend national
boundaries. An invention or trade secret may be used or eibodied in
things or processes anywhere in the world. A literary work may be reproduced anywhere; the copyright may be owned by a person who
neither owns nor possesses any physical article. The attractive quality
of a trademark or name spreads easily across borders. Historically,
however, these rights originated within local or national environments.
Like human rights, which one might wish were universal, intellectual
property rights only occasionally transcend national borders and even
then may not be given the same effect.
This paper does not deal in detail with any of the intellectual property rights. Its object is to trace developments in which national sovereignty has to some degree been relinquished for corresponding gains in
international recognition of intellectual property rights.

II.

HISTORICALLY SOVEREIGN REGIMES

Sovereign nations have always had their own ideas about what
rights, if any, they wish to recognize or confer on those who invest
time, capital and energy in creativity, innovation and enterprise. In relation to intellectual property the initial focus was upon rewarding
those who stimulated what was then primarily local trade and industry.
In 1623, in the reign of James I, the parliament of the United Kingdom
of England and Scotland enacted the Statute of Monopolies which,
though curbing the grant of monopolies by the Crown, preserved the
sovereign's right to grant, for a term not exceeding fourteen years, letters patent to those who introduced into the realm "any manner of new
manufactures." There was no thought of according rights to those who
did nothing to promote manufacture within the realm, but patents were
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granted to foreigners who were prepared to do so. The United States
took a somewhat different approach in its Patent Act of 1793, under
which only U.S. citizens were eligible to apply for U.S. patents. This
precedent was varied in 1851 in New Brunswick, then one of the British colonies in North America, by making New Brunswick patents
available only to persons resident in New Brunswick.
In copyright, the 1709 Statute of Anne was enacted for the benefit
of domestic publishers, then called stationers. The first U.S. Copyright
Act of 1790 provided that only American citizens and residents were
entitled to U.S. copyright. The United States persisted until the late
1980s in making it awkward for foreigners to acquire U.S. copyrights.
Views about intellectual property have been anything but static.
National laws and practices have shifted with changes of administration, with balances of payment and with the stage of national development. It was only in the latter part of the 19th century that self interest
led a few important nations to recognize the need for their own entrepreneurs and authors to have their works and businesses protected
abroad. This led to two important international treaties (conventions)
which required restrictions on national freedom of action.
III.

THE PARIS AND BERNE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS OF THE

1880s
After preparatory work beginning in 1873, the Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property was signed in 1883 by 11
countries. It entered into force in 1884. The United States joined in
1887. The present membership of well over 100 countries includes most
of the major nations, important exceptions being India and Pakistan.
As revised from time to time the Convention relates to the protection of
inventions, industrial designs, utility models, trademarks, trade names
and indications of source. It also includes a provision relating to unfair
competition. The key provision of the Convention is in Article 2 which
established the principle of national treatment, that is to say, that each
member state shall grant to nationals of the others the same advantages as it grants to its own nationals. The Convention requires member states to include a few other minimum provisions in their domestic
laws, a principal provision being that a local application for protection
is to be treated as if filed on the same day as the first filed foreign
application if the local application is made within a certain period, one
year in the case of a patent application. However, the Convention
leaves ample scope for differences in national laws. Another of its key
principles is that national intellectual property rights are independent
of one another.
The Paris Convention does not extend to copyright. A number of
bilateral copyright arrangements had been made prior to 1885. In that
year a conference was held in Berne which resulted in the Berne Copy-
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right Convention which was signed in 1886 by 9 countries and entered
into force in 1887. This Convention has also been revised several times.
It was not until 1989 that, largely because of pressures from important
American copyright industries, the U.S. joined the Berne Convention,
though the U.S. had in 1955 adhered to the less significant Universal
Copyright Convention (the UCC). Like the Paris Convention, Berne is
founded on the national treatment principle, but leaves great scope for
variations in national laws. Its present membership of about 100 countries includes all major nations except the Russian Federation.
IV.

THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION

(WIPO)

WIPO was established in 1967 by a Convention that came into
force in 1970. It is a specialized agency of the United Nations, successor to the Bureaux Internationaux R6unis pour la Protection de la
Propri6t6 Industriel (BIRPI) which was founded in 1883 to administer
the Paris Convention. In 1886 the Berne Convention was added to the
care of this organization, which has since been charged with the administration of numerous additional treaties and arrangements relating to
intellectual property. National memberships in these treaties and arrangements vary from one to another. In entering into them, the participating nations agree to rules which limit their sovereignty as long as
they continue to adhere.
In addition to being members of the Paris and Berne Conventions,
both the United States and Canada have joined the Patent Cooperation
Treaty (PCT), first negotiated in 1970 and which, for its approximately
60 members, reduces duplication of work by national patent offices, but
leads to separate national grants. Both countries have also joined the
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
(UPOV) which came into force in 1968 and, with a present membership of about 22, sets international standards for national grants of
rights for breeders of new plant varieties. Canada is expected to join
other WIPO administered treaties to which the United States belongs,
namely, the Budapest Treaty for Deposit of Microorganisms, the Geneva Phonograms Convention, and the Brussels Satellite Convention.
Neither the United States nor Canada has yet joined two other WIPO
administered treaties which are the subject of current efforts to make
them more attractive, namely, the Madrid Agreement for Trade-mark
Registration and the Hague Agreement for Deposit of Industrial
Designs.
WIPO has had numerous activities other than its work in administering and seeking to expand and upgrade the foregoing and other arrangements. For developing countries WIPO has provided educational
information and training services relating to the development and administration of intellectual property laws. In 1991, it initiated similar
activities for European countries that are making a transition to market
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economies. WIPO is proposing to set up an arbitration center for resolution of intellectual property disputes between private parties.
Countries which belong to the Convention which established
WIPO determine WIPO's policies. WIPO has no coercive powers. It
seeks to expand the number of countries which adhere to the arrangements for which it is responsible, and to achieve consensus on changes
to those arrangements. In these efforts, it cannot be expected always to
succeed. It has had its disappointments. A proposed Trademark Registration Treaty was never agreed. A Treaty on Intellectual Property in
Respect of Integrated Circuits is in limbo. A Diplomatic Conference
which first met in 1980 with the objective of revising the Paris Convention failed, primarily because of wishes of developing countries (the socalled Group of 77) to increase their freedom to grant licenses against
the wishes of patentees. Also debated were concerns of some developed
countries (in Group B) to strengthen protection for appellations of origin such as Champagne for wines, Gouda for cheese and Parma for
ham. Another stumbling point was the wish of the Soviet led socialist
countries (Group D) to achieve enhanced status for their system of
granting "inventors' certificates", a system that is now disappearing
with the collapse of communism.
More promising has been an ongoing effort by WIPO to achieve
greater harmonization ("approximation") of national intellectual property laws. Some of these efforts, particularly ones related to patents,
have been delayed, in part because of the attention that was focused on
the Uruguay round of negotiations to revise the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
In recent years WIPO has sometimes been upstaged, particularly
by more effective action discussed below within the European Community and in the recently completed Uruguay round of negotiations
under the GATT. It remains to be seen whether, with completion of the
latter negotiations, greater attention will now be turned to WIPO's efforts, which are devoted exclusively to intellectual property matters.
Independently of WIPO, there are numerous multilateral and bilateral treaties relating to intellectual property. Some European ones
are mentioned later. Reference has earlier been made to the Universal
Copyright Convention, which is administered by UNESCO and to
which the United States and Canada belong. The United States, but
not Canada, belongs to a Pan-American treaty which provides the basis
for the copyright notice "all rights reserved." These and many other
arrangements do not call for consideration here. The point to note is
that there are numerous instances where some sovereignty has been relinquished in intellectual property matters in order to achieve a measure of cooperation between nations. WIPO has extended its good offices to many of the non-WIPO organizations in order to enhance such
international cooperation.

200
V.
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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AS NONTARIFF BARRIERS TO

TRADE

National sovereignty over intellectual property rights may distort
international trade in various ways. Consider the following possibilities:
(1) A patent, copyright or trademark may subsist in one country
but have no counterpart in a second country. Someone unrelated to
the owner of the patent, copyright or trademark may with impunity
sell in the second country goods of the kind claimed in the patent, or
copies of the work in which copyright subsists, or goods bearing the
trademark. However, the owner of the patent, copyright or trademark
may be able to proceed against anyone who imports such goods or
copies into the first country, where the intellectual property right subsists. This is particularly important to the intellectual property owner
where the imports are counterfeit.
(2) The position may be more complex where similar rights subsist on opposite sides of a border.
(a) The rights in the two countries may be completely
independent of each other. For example, because of differences in patent laws, an invention made by a first inventor
may be patentable by that inventor in one country whereas a
second inventor who worked independently of the first may be
entitled to the patent in another country, so that an article
legitimately sold in one country may infringe if imported into
the other. A trademark legitimately applied to goods in one
country may be confusingly similar to a trademark or trade
name that has been coined independently in another country
and that is enforceable against trademarked goods imported
from the first country. It may be possible to acquire trademark rights in the second country though the mark was
adopted knowing of its prior use in the first country if the
rights are independent nationally.
(b) Though there is common ownership of the rights on
opposite sides of the border, the rights may not be co-extensive. For example, a patent granted in one country for an invention may, because of differences in patent laws or procedures, be of different scope than a patent granted to the same
person in a second country for the same invention. The consequence is that a third party's sale of articles in the first country may not infringe the patent in the first country, but importation of the same articles into the second country may
infringe the patent there.
(3) Other situations which have arisen with the expansion of international trade are ones where imported goods were originally sold
abroad by the person who also owns the intellectual property right in
the country of importation, or where the goods were originally sold
abroad by that person's foreign assignee, licensee or other related entity. These are cases of "grey goods." They may also be called cases
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of "parallel imports" where their importation has not been authorized
by the local intellectual property owner and they thus flow in channels
parallel to imports that are authorized by that owner. The argument
is made that such articles, legitimately sold abroad with authorization, should be free to come in. According to this argument, such a
policy is in the interest of encouraging competition and the production
of goods in the most economic location, the intellectual property
owner having presumably benefited in some way from the original foreign sale so that any intellectual property rights should be "exhausted." Intellectual property owners tend to resist this argument,
noting inter alia that the costs of innovation may not be recouped by
sales in countries where intellectual property rights are weak. Weak
protection abroad can mean weak protection at home if barriers to
importation are removed. The intellectual property system seeks to reserve to the creator, innovator or entrepreneur certain exclusivity as a
reward and inducement, and there are various ways of doing this: by
conferring a longer or shorter term of protection; by providing protection against misrepresentation or against copying or against any adoption by others; and by protection against imports. Protection against
imports may encourage the granting of foreign licenses in the knowledge that the licensor's domestic market is protected against imports
of goods of the licensee. Licensing abroad encourages the transfer of
technology. Foreign licensing may be facilitated if the foreign licensee
will be protected from competition by goods of the licensor. Protection
against imports may ensure the production of a full range of goods
domestically, whereas foreign suppliers may invest only in the best
sellers, once the local intellectual property owner has established a
market. Revenues from the protected local market may be needed to
expand beyond that market. Changing the status quo may adversely
affect good faith investments based on the intellectual property protection that was thought to be available. A change in the law to allow
goods of a foreign licensee to enter the local market would confer
upon that licensee a bonanza for which he or she had not paid. These
are some of the considerations that legislatures may face in striking
the right balance between territorial intellectual property rights and
freedom of trade.
Thus, nontariff barriers may arise in intellectual property cases for
a variety of reasons, principal ones being differences in national intellectual property laws or procedures, giving rise to different rights in
different countries, failure or inability of an innovator to acquire rights
in all countries, independent acquisition of inconsistent rights (e.g.,
trademark rights) on opposite sides of a border, and granting of licenses or assignments for foreign countries. The barriers to trade that
may arise stem from creativity, innovation and entrepreneurial activity.
They cannot be equated with more conventional trade barriers such as
tariffs and quotas. Intellectual property owners therefore lobby their
governments to favor domestically produced goods. Express statutory
provisions against imports of grey goods have sometimes been granted,
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an example being some copyright laws which protect local authors
against importation of their books published under their authority
abroad but sometimes sold there at reduced prices, particularly when
"remaindered." Because the various kinds of intellectual property
rights vary enormously in scope and duration, and in their impact on
trade, manufacturing and culture, the lobbying efforts of different
rights holders may provoke different responses in different countries.
The United States has copyright and trademark legislation pursuant to
which owners of intellectual property rights have resorted successfully
to prevent importation of some grey goods. Trademark owners in various countries have had successes in preventing importation of goods
sold abroad under their trade-marks but made to specifications different than those which are expected in the country of intended importation. Intellectual property rights may be manipulated in efforts to minimize relationships between owners in different countries and thereby
isolate rights and markets. Such efforts may attract the attention of
legislators. The exercise of intellectual property rights can be more effective than efforts to control trade by contractual arrangements. The
latter ordinarily have no effect on third parties who may acquire the
goods in question, and restrictive agreements may conflict with national
laws relating to restraint of trade.
Existing intellectual property conventions and other agreements do
not interfere with a national decision to provide a higher level of intellectual property protection than the agreement requires, and, as the
foregoing discussion shows, this may affect traders whose products are
designed to avoid rights that exist at home but that run foul of rights
abroad. Nor do existing international agreements deal expressly with
the effect of intellectual property on cross-border trade, although, as
discussed later, the Treaty of Rome has been construed as governing
the exercise of intellectual property rights on such trade within the European Community (now the European Union).
VI.

TRADE PRESSURES SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR

During the last half of the twentieth century, and particularly in
the last two decades, there has been a surge of activity designed to
establish effective intellectual property rights internationally and thus
to reduce national sovereignty over intellectual property rights. This activity has taken at least three forms.
The first, not so self evidently trade related and led by WIPO as
already discussed, has primarily been an effort to reach agreement on
principles, leading to more uniformity of laws and procedures, greater
predictability of treatment and more efficiency in acquiring rights.
The second has been part of efforts to achieve a single market or
freer trade, reviewed under the next headings with reference to devel-
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opments within Europe and within North America.
The third, only mentioned now and elaborated upon after discussing the North American and GATT trade negotiations, is trade pressure that has sometimes been exerted unilaterally by developed countries to achieve for their own nationals rights in other countries
comparable to ones they have at home.
A. The European Union (EU), the European Economic Area (EEA),
and other European Institutions
The European Economic Community (EEC) was established by
the Treaty of Rome in 1952. It became known colloquially as the European Community (EC), a name that is still used, but with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, which amended the Treaty of Rome in
1993, the name European Union (EU) has been adopted. In what follows, I shall refer indifferently to the EC or the EU.
The Treaty of Rome is the EU's constitution. The ultimate authority on interpretation of the Treaty is the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) based in Luxembourg. Decisions of the ECJ are binding
throughout the EU. Questions of European law, flowing from the
Treaty and from legislation made under it, are sometimes referred to
the ECJ by national courts for authoritative rulings.
An important aim of the Treaty of Rome, stated in Article 3, is
"the approximation of the laws of the member states for the proper
functioning of the common market." The Treaty also seeks the elimination, as between member states, of customs duties and of quantitative
restrictions on the import and export of goods "and of all other measures having equivalent effect." Several of the ECJ's decision have been
concerned with questions of grey goods, parallel imports and exhaustion of intellectual property rights, to which reference has been made
earlier in considering intellectual property rights as nontariff barriers.
To a marked degree the ECJ has supported the exhaustion of rights
theory, so that an intellectual property right existing in one member
state may not be effective against goods or services originating in another member state, though it may be effective against those imported
into the EU. Having regard to Article 7 of the Treaty of Rome which
lays down a general principle of non-discrimination, the ECJ has ruled
that legislation of a member state cannot deny intellectual property
rights to nationals of other member states that it accords to its own
nationals.
The ECJ has also had to consider the legality of intellectual property arrangements which may violate provisions of the Treaty relating
to the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the
common market, or abuse of dominant position.
On the legislative front, the European Commission has taken numerous steps that further encroach upon national sovereignty in intel-
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lectual property matters. The legislative process within the EU is complex and has been made more so by the Maastricht Treaty, but in
broad outline it is the European Commission which formulates proposals for approximation of laws. In some circumstances the Commission
may act on its own. In others there is a need for "codecision" of the
Council of the European Union (the Council of Ministers) and the European Parliament, which may veto or require amendment of the Commission's proposals. The legislation takes the form, under Article 87 of
the Treaty of Rome, of Regulations that are binding on member states
and require no further implementation by them, and Directives which
set out objectives, leaving the manner of implementation to the discretion of the legislatures of the individual states. There has been, for example, a regulation on patent and know-how licensing agreements
under which the Commission has issued "block exemptions" which exempt certain agreements from the Treaty provisions relating to competition. Where an agreement does not benefit from a block exemption,
there has been a procedure for notifying the agreement to the Commission for a "negative clearance," i.e. for a ruling as to whether in the
view of the Commission the agreement prevents, restricts or distorts
competition or constitutes an abuse of dominant position within the
meaning of the Treaty. Another regulation, now proposed to be broadened, enables the Commission to establish border measures against importation of counterfeit trademarked goods and pirated copies of copyright works. Existing directives to member states include one on
protection of computer programs as literary works, and another on protecting the topographies of semiconductor products. There is a recent
directive to fix the term of copyright for most works at 70 years after
the death of the author, with the consequence that some expired copyrights will be revived. Pending are proposals for regulations or directives relating, inter alia, to comparative advertising and to legal protection of electronic databases.
The Commission also has enforcement powers. It may investigate
alleged breaches of Community law and attempt to resolve them, failing which it may bring proceedings before the ECJ. The Commission
has its own decision making powers in certain areas, subject to appeal
to the ECJ. Depending on the circumstances, therefore, remedies may
be available from the Commission, the ECJ, or from national courts.
The EU represents the most invasive and dynamic transfer of national sovereignty to supranational authority over intellectual property
matters. However, national intellectual property rights continue to exist
within the EU and continue to be granted, consistently with the international obligations of member states. For example, it is a common
occurrence for a patent, granted for one member state, to be of substantially different scope than a corresponding patent granted for another. National patent and trademark offices have not been superseded
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by the international organizations that also exist in Europe. The socalled "European patent" granted by the European Patent Office (to
which I refer later) is a bundle of national patents, the number being
dependent on the number of member countries for which fees have
been paid. National courts have not lost jurisdiction to decide issues of
validity and infringement of intellectual property rights.
A regulation has been adopted to establish a Community Trade
Mark that is effective throughout the EU, to be registered in a Community Trade Marks Office called The Office for Harmonization in the
Internal Market. That Office is not expected to be in full operation for
many months. There is a proposal for an EU wide Community Design,
and another for a Community Patent, though the latter, relatively old
proposal has made little headway. The EU-wide rights that would be
available under these proposals would coexist with national trademarks,
designs and patents, but the objective seems to be ultimately to phase
out national rights to the extent that this can be done without unduly
prejudicing a plethora of already vested rights.
On January 1, 1994 the European Economic Area (EEA) came
into being, affecting the 12 member states of the EU, namely, the
United Kingdom, Ireland, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Spain, Portugal and Greece, as well as
five of the member states of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA),
namely, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland and Austria. This creates a
free trade area with a population of almost 380 million. The contracting parties of the EEA are required, within periods of transition,
to adjust their intellectual property legislation to be compatible with
the free circulation of goods and services and with the level of protection that has been obtained in the EU. An aspect of this is that the
contracting parties are obliged to adhere to the major international
conventions administered by WIPO, namely, the Paris and Berne Conventions, the Rome Convention ensuring protection of performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting organizations, the Madrid
Agreement on international registration of trademarks, and the Patent
Cooperation Treaty which eliminates some duplication of effort by national patent offices.
The founding agreement establishing the EEA may lead to ultimate expansion of the EU to include the EFTA countries in all respects. The EEA agreement has provisions that are markedly similar to
those of the Treaty of Rome. It includes an "Acquis Communitaire,"
listing measures that were effective in the EC up to July 31, 1991, and
that are automatically extended from the EU to the whole of the EEA.
A European Patent Office is operated by the European Patent Organization (EPO), a body that is independent of WIPO and (unlike the
proposed European Trademark Office) independent of the European
Union's institutions mentioned above. However, all contracting parties
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of the EEA are required to be members of the EPO, which also includes Switzerland, Liechtenstein and Monaco - states that are not
members of the EEA (though Liechtenstein is expected to join the
EEA). The European Patent Office is headquartered in Munich. As a
result of a single application made to the European Patent Office, one
may obtain national patents in member states of the EPO. Because of
the national treatment principle enshrined in the Paris Convention, nationals of all countries that are members of the Paris Convention have
access to the European Patent Office and have, or will have, access to
other intellectual property offices that may be set up for use by nationals of member states of the EEA.
Brief reference should be made to some other subsisting European
arrangements that are independent of ones already mentioned, and independent of ones administered by WIPO, and that reflect some surrender of national sovereignty. The Benelux Trademark Office and the
Benelux Designs Office issue trademark registrations and design registrations that are effective in Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The Nordic countries, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland,
have substantially harmonized their intellectual property laws. The
Council of Europe has a Convention on the Unification of Certain
Points of Substantive Law on Patents for Inventions and another, of no
importance, on formalities. Three other European Agreements relate to
protection of television broadcasts, program exchanges by means of television films, and prevention of broadcasts transmitted from stations
outside national territories.
B. The Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Between the United States and
Canada, and Cultural Exemptions
The FTA, signed on January 2, 1988, was being negotiated by the
United States and Canada at the same time as negotiations were proceeding in the Uruguay round for revision of the GATT. It was clear
that the United States attached greater importance to the GATT negotiations. In the FTA, only two matters expressly relating to intellectual
property were agreed. The first was confirmation of an undertaking,
previously given at the 1985 "shamrock summit" by Prime Minister
Mulroney to President Reagan, that Canada would provide a right to
equitable remuneration of copyright owners when radio and television
signals, intended for free over-the-air reception, are retransmitted to
the public beyond the normal area of reception. Canada amended its
Copyright Act to fulfil this obligation by making royalties payable from
January 1, 1990, for the retransmission of radio and TV signals.
The other provision in the FTA relating expressly to intellectual
property was that the parties would cooperate in the GATT and other
international fora to improve protection of intellectual property.
The FTA exempted "cultural industries" from its provisions, and
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provided that to the extent that one party availed itself of the exemption, the other could in response take measures "of equivalent commercial effect." "Cultural industries" were defined (here, as elsewhere, I
am giving the general thrust) as relating to the distribution of books,
periodicals and music; the production, distribution and exhibition of
films and audio and video recordings; and broadcasting services. In the
subsequent North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the
FTA exemption was retained as between the United States and Canada, with the added provision that rights and obligations as to exempted cultural measures between Canada and Mexico (and any other
country that may join NAFTA) will be identical to any applying between Canada and the United States. France insisted upon a similar
cultural exemption in the GATT negotiations. These exemptions have
less to do with intellectual property rights than with subsidies, dumping, tariffs, quotas, taxation, postal rates, employment, censorship and
other matters that influence trade balances and that protect commercial enterprises that might otherwise suffer from tough competition. Insofar as intellectual property may be affected, copyright is of course
vital to literature, art, drama and music and to performances and communications. However, there is no cultural exemption under other treaties, and in particular under the Berne Copyright Convention. Therefore, a country such as Canada or France is not free to adopt a cultural
exemption that would impinge upon the rights that it must accord to
others under Berne, despite anything in the FTA, NAFTA or under
GATT. The freedom exists only in cases not addressed by Berne. A
cultural exemption that Canada had before the FTA, that is not contrary to Berne, and that Canada has therefore been free to retain in its
Copyright Act, protects authors against the importation into Canada of
books of theirs that are printed abroad with their consent. This protection benefits Canadian authors more than foreign ones. Berne does not
require a retransmission right. That right was granted to Americans by
Canadian compliance with the FTA. It was one of a few rights that the
FTA specifically excluded from the cultural exemption. It benefits
Americans far more than Canadians. Finally, it remains to be noted
that the FTA included provisions for the resolution of disputes.
C. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
Almost five years after the conclusion of the FTA the United
States, Canada and Mexico signed NAFTA on December 17, 1992.
Negotiations in the Uruguay round of the GATT were still ongoing,
and were not concluded until December 15, 1993, but a proposed intellectual property text for the GATT had been released on December 21,
1991 (the Dunkel text). There was an expectation that the Dunkel text
would be close to the ultimate agreement in the GATT negotiations
with respect to intellectual property. That proved to be the case.
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Before discussing the ultimate intellectual property agreement in
the NAFTA negotiations, it is necessary to go back in history and to
refer again to the FTA negotiations. An issue that was clearly of importance to the United States was Canada's discriminatory treatment
of patents for the production of medicines and foods. In 1923, the Canadian parliament had included in the Patent Act a provision which
precluded the grant of patents for medicines or foods if produced by
chemical processes. For such products, only patents for processes of
production were allowed leaving it open to competitors to devise alternative, noninfringing processes. Further, the Commissioner of Patents
was authorized to grant to anyone a license (a compulsory license)
under a patent for producing a medicine or food, unless the Commissioner saw good reason not to grant a license. The Commissioner was to
fix a royalty or other compensation to be paid for the license. This 1923
provision was interpreted as limiting the license to a right to manufacture the medicine or food in Canada. Few licenses were granted. However, in 1969, with medicines becoming increasingly available from
sources in countries where no effective patent protection could be obtained, and at prices much lower than those charged by patentees in
Canada, the Canadian Patent Act was amended to make it clear that
the Commissioner could grant compulsory licenses to import medicines.
This led to the grant of a flood of such licenses, with royalties fixed by
the Commissioner at levels that patentees regarded as derisory in relation to their costs of research and of establishing a market. At the time
when the FTA was being negotiated, the Canadian parliament was engaged in politically charged debates over government proposals, ultimately brought into force in November, 1987, to strengthen the patent
protection for medicines. The proposals included delaying the right to
operate under a compulsory license (with some preference for Canadian made inventions) and making possible the grant of patents for
medicines and foods without restriction as to the process of production.
These 1987 Canadian amendments fell substantially short of what the
United States was being pressed to achieve under the FTA by its multinational drug firms. Canada's refusal or political inability to do more
was undoubtedly an important reason for the lack of any reference to
patents in the FTA. The United States was unable to agree to relatively weak patent protection anywhere for such a significant industry.
To do so would have been an encouragement to other nations which
were reluctant to accept strong intellectual property protection in the
pending GATT negotiations; the FTA would not provide a strong
"demonstration effect."
There were several other controversial and important issues relating to intellectual property that had weighed in the FTA negotiations.
However, during the NAFTA round it became clear that Mexico
would bow to U.S. demands that it strengthen its very weak intellectual
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property laws. Substantial amendments were made to Mexican intellectual property legislation in June, 1991. The progress being made in the
GATT negotiations, and the release of the Dunkel text in December,
1991, strongly indicated that Canada's discrimination against patents
relating to medicines and foods would have to end. Emboldened, and
under constant pressure from the United States and the innovative
drug firms, the Canadian government in June 1992 introduced legislation, in part retroactive to the date when the Dunkel text was released,
repealing all special provisions in the Patent Act relating to medicines
and foods, though strengthening a price control mechanism administered by a Patented Medicine Prices Review Board. The path was open
for an intellectual property agreement as part of NAFTA. This was
achieved in the NAFTA text signed on December 17, 1992, bringing
NAFTA into effect on January 1, 1994.
I shall not list all the intellectual property provisions of NAFTA.
They are similar to ones that were in the Dunkel text, that were agreed
to in the GATT negotiations, and that are referred to later. Among
them, however, may be noted a much sought after concession from the
United States. The U.S. Patent Act has long had a provision that a
foreign inventor doing work outside the United States cannot rely on
that foreign work in a U.S. contest to determine who, as between independent inventors, was the first. This was a clear disincentive to setting
up research facilities outside the United States. The U.S. legislation
that implements NAFTA hedges this concession with a condition that
account may be taken of whether foreign evidence is available comparable to that obtainable under the wide ranging discovery procedures
that are available in the United States. Countries other than the
United States, including Canada, pay little heed to who was the first
inventor and none to where inventive activity occurred. Their laws
award a patent to the first who filed a patent application. Canada's
NAFTA Implementation Act actually goes beyond the minimum
NAFTA requirements, making additional changes to Canadian intellectual property laws.
Under NAFTA, Mexico has been given some breathing time to
protect plant breeders' rights and integrated circuit layouts, and to put
in place mechanisms for enforcing intellectual property rights against
imports. A major contribution of NAFTA is that it imposes treaty obligations that obstruct a national return to the past.
NAFTA also includes dispute settlement provisions.
D.

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT-TRIPs)

Until 1986 WIPO had been the principal international forum for
discussions about revising intellectual property laws. A well perceived
difficulty about making progress under WIPO was its division into
three principal camps which also divided the United Nations, namely,

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:195 1994

the so-called developed nations (Group B), the developing ones (77 nations, subsequently increased in number but known as the Group of
77), and the Soviet led socialist ones (Group D). As mentioned earlier,
among WIPO's difficulties has been the inability of these groups to
reach a consensus. Agreement could not be reached during drawn-out
negotiations that broke down in the early 1980s, on compulsory licensing of patents, on protection of appellations of origin, and on the status
of inventors' certificates. Significant also was WIPO's lack of means for
effective adjudication on and enforcement of obligations undertaken by
member countries.
The developed nations, led by the United States, turned to GATT
as a more promising forum for strengthening intellectual property
rights. Not being focused solely on intellectual property issues, GATT
offered greater opportunities for negotiating trade-offs. It also had the
custom of imposing deadlines for completing negotiations, and it had
mechanisms for dispute settlement. It presented the opportunity to reduce foot dragging by countries of the Group of 77 and Group D.
The GATT, formed in 1977, had been revised from time to time in
various "rounds." It was due for another round of trade related discussions, so at a meeting in Uruguay in September, 1986 a new round was
initiated. On the initiative of the United States it was agreed to take up
the topic of trade related aspects of intellectual property rights
(TRIPs). While the Uruguay round negotiations were proceeding, the
United States ended its discrimination against foreigners under its
Copyright Act, and Canada dropped its discrimination against patents
relating to medicines and foods. Such actions took a bit of the steam
out of criticisms that developed countries do not practice what they
preach.
In the initial stages of the Uruguay round, some countries with
little enthusiasm for the topic of intellectual property suggested that
many intellectual property issues that were brought to the table were
not trade related. Such objections did not prevail. As noted earlier in
this paper, differences in intellectual property regimes may constitute
substantial barriers to trade. If intellectual property barriers to imports
of goods do not exist, local intellectual property rights may be undermined by the lack of effective protection where the goods were produced abroad. The existence or lack of intellectual property protection
in a country may affect decisions on whether to invest there. Investment may stimulate local creativity, leading to trading opportunities.
The Uruguay round of the GATT negotiations was concluded on
December 15, 1993, and the resultant agreement was signed on April
15, 1994 at a meeting of trade ministers of the 120 GATT member
states. At the time of writing, some countries must still ratify the
agreement. In the United States, once legislation to implement the
agreement is submitted to Congress it must be approved or disap-
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proved, without amendment, within ninety legislative days under the
fast-track procedure. GATT will become known as the World Trade
Organization (WTO).
Though the membership of GATT is larger than that of either the
Paris and Berne Conventions to which reference has earlier been made,
the TRIPs agreement requires compliance by member states with all
the substantive provisions of both the Paris and Berne Conventions at
their highest (most recent) levels, save for the "moral rights" provisions
in Berne. Additionally, the TRIPs agreement adds substantially to
what is required by those Conventions.
No attempt is made here to summarize all the provisions of the 31
page TRIPs agreement, which includes 73 Articles. The following comments merely indicate the general nature of some of the provisions,
omitting many details. The standards of availability and scope of rights
are spelled out in Part II of the agreement with respect to copyright
and related rights, trademarks, geographical indications (appellations
of origin), industrial designs, patents, integrated circuit topographies
and confidential information. Article 40 of Part II deals briefly with
anti-competitive provisions in contractual licenses. The Article leaves it
open for member states to specify in their national legislation "licensing practices or conditions that may in particular cases constitute an
abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant market." It gives as examples "exclusive
grantback conditions, conditions preventing challenges to validity, and
coercive package licensing." Such provisions are ones that have been
viewed critically in at least the United States and the European Union.
On the other hand, what one member state characterizes as an abuse
may be regarded by another as legitimate, and the Article goes on to
require that where, for example, a company of member state X is considered by the U.S. to be violating U.S. laws, or where a U.S. company
is subject to proceedings for violating X's laws, then X will agree to
consult with the U.S. about the matter and will cooperate in providing
relevant information, subject to the safeguarding of confidential information. The only other reference in the TRIPs agreement to possible
abuse of intellectual property rights is in Article 8 which states as a
general principle that "[a]ppropriate measures, provided they are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent
the abuse of intellectual property right holders or the resort to practices
which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international
transfer of technology."
Part II of the TRIPs agreement goes some distance to resolving
the impasse that, as mentioned earlier, had stymied negotiations in
WIPO' to amend the Paris Convention. According to Article 27, compulsory licenses under patents may not be granted for failure of the
patentee to manufacture locally. Provisions for compulsory licensing on
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that ground have existed in the laws of many countries, including Canada. Article 31 imposes a variety of constraints designed, inter alia, to
ensure that each application for a compulsory license is considered on
its individual merits and that any compulsory license provides adequate
remuneration to the patentee and does not preclude competition by the
patentee or its voluntary licensees. There must be a right of appeal.
The Article also precludes the practice that some countries have of licensing, under a first patent, someone who manages to obtain a second
patent for only a minor development. On protection of appellations of
origin (Champagne, etc.), which was a second cause of difficulty in
WIPO, the TRIPs agreement goes some distance towards a solution.
Articles 22 to 24 preserve the status quo for appellations which, in a
particular country, have lost the distinctiveness which they may still
have elsewhere, while requiring member states to ensure a right to take
action to prevent misleading of the public as to geographical origin,
with a concomitant right to prevent or invalidate registrations of misleading marks. For geographical indications of wines and spirits there
are special provisions to prevent loss of distinctiveness through use of
terms such as "Scotch type whiskey." A Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights is set up to provide, inter alia, a
forum for further negotiations. The problem in WIPO of the status of
inventors' certificates under the Paris Convention seems to have disappeared with the abandonment of that system in the Russian Federation.
Another important provision in the TRIPs agreement relating to
patents is in Article 27 which requires that, with a few significant exceptions, patents shall be available for any type of invention, whether
for a product or a process. Thus, for example, a member state such as
Brazil or Argentina will not, after a transitional period, be able to deny
patents for medicines unless that states opts out of the Uruguay round
and forfeits its rights under GATT. Nor will member states be able to
confine the inventor of a new product to a process for producing it, as
Canada once did for most medicines and foods, and as many countries
still do. Whereas in some countries patents have a relatively short duration (in India, for example, in the case of patents for medicines, foods
or insecticides), the TRIPs agreement requires a minimum term of
twenty years, counted from the filing date of the patent application.
The major concession by the United States, paralleling the one discussed earlier with reference to NAFTA, is its acceptance of a provision that patents shall be available without discrimination as to the
place of invention.
There is a requirement in TRIPs Article 27 that member states
must provide protection for plant varieties either by patents or by an
effective sui generis system or by a combination of these, though the
whole subject of protection relating to plants and animals is expressly
made subject to further review.
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For the first time the GATT deals with trade in services. This is
reflected in Article 15 of the TRIPs agreement which provides for protection of marks that are used for goods or for services.
Producers of films, recordings and computer programs have heretofore been deprived of large revenues because of unauthorized copying
of their works. Some countries have imposed a levy on sales of blank
tapes or copying machines; the proceeds are distributed to those whose
works are probably being copied. Articles 11 and 14 of the TRIPs
agreement tackle the problem partially by requiring that owners of
copyright in films, recordings and computer programs be accorded a
right to control commercial rentals, though there are some qualifications, among them the possible continued reliance on levies on sales.
Performers are to have the right to prevent unauthorized recording of
their performances and unauthorized over-the-air broadcasting of their
live performances to the public.
Difficulties have sometimes arisen in protecting confidential commercial information, particularly in countries such as Japan where the
corporate culture differs from ours. (In China, which is not yet a
GATT member, there is a ten year limit on confidentiality of knowhow.) Article 39 of the TRIPs agreement calls for the protection of
such information against not only those with whom one deals, but also
against third parties who know, or were grossly negligent in failing to
know, that a breach of obligation has occurred.
Another point on which there has been criticism of Japan is that
proceedings leading to the grant of a Japanese patent have sometimes
been so drawn out that the patent is not granted before the technology
that it covers is obsolescent. Part IV of the TRIPs agreement, dealing
with the acquisition and maintenance of intellectual property rights,
includes a provision that procedures for the grant or registration of
rights shall permit the granting or registration within a reasonable time
so as to avoid unwarranted curtailment of the period of protection.
In its general provisions the TRIPs agreement, Part I, adopts the
national treatment principle of the intellectual property conventions, requiring each member state to accord to the nationals of other member
states treatment that is no less favorable than it accords to its own
nationals. TRIPs adds to intellectual property treaties the most favored
nation principle that has been characteristic of GATT. Thus, where a
member state accords favored treatment to the nationals of another
member it must accord the same treatment to the nationals of all members. The agreement leaves to member states the appropriate method of
implementing the agreement under their diverse legal systems and
practices. However, there are some very detailed provisions in Part III
relating to procedures and evidence that are to be made available to
enforce intellectual property rights, and to the prescription of remedies,
including border measures, directed against counterfeit trade-marked
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goods and pirated copies of copyright works.
Provisions are made in Parts VI and VII for cooperation in, and
for phasing in, many of the provisions of the TRIPs agreement. Parts V
and VII include provisions for monitoring progress and for dispute settlement. There is to be set up under GATT a Multilateral Trade Organization (MTO) whose strengthened dispute settlement procedures
may require the United Stats to look again at its unilateral actions
under section 301 of the Trade Act and section 337 of the Tariff Act,
both referred to under the next heading.
To those who would like to have had a TRIPs agreement that includes further impingements on national sovereignty, there are some
disappointments. Those who are dubious about intellectual property arrangements that inhibit the importation of goods though they were
marketed abroad with the consent of an intellectual property owner in
the country of intended importation (i.e. those who would prefer an
international system like the internal one within the EU where it can
be difficult to impede the flow of so-called grey goods), will be disappointed that, with minor exceptions, the TRIPs agreement provides in
Article 6 that the agreement cannot be invoked to deal with such
issues.
On the other hand, the multinational drug firms and others are
disappointed with the vagueness of a TRIPs provision in Article 8 that
permits member states to "adopt measures necessary to protect public
health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of
vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development." They are unhappy about the length of the transition periods
that are available under Part VI to "developing" countries and to countries "in the process of transformation from a centrally-planned economy into a market, free-enterprise economy," and even longer periods
that are available to "least-developed" countries. Hopes were not realized to obtain "pipeline protection," which would make the agreement
applicable to patents that may issue before a country becomes bound
by the TRIPs agreement.
The U.S. entertainment industry is incensed at the cultural exemption, insisted upon by France and with precedent in the FTA,
NAFTA and in an EC Directive, allowing countries to do such things
as subsidize domestic producers of audiovisual works and to tax and
restrict market access to foreign works.
There is also a sentiment in some developing countries that the
outcome of the TRIPs negotiations confirms an attitude in developed
nations that might makes right.
E. Trade Pressures Exercised Against Individual Countries
Supplementing the developments outlined above, there have been
pressures, exerted primarily by the United States and the European
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Community (Union), to have individual countries upgrade their intellectual property laws. These pressures have had their effects not only
directly against recalcitrant countries, but also in the Uruguay round
and the North American negotiations. The pressures have come from
countries where innovation in technology, in marketing and in the arts
has flourished, and stem from concerns that free rides are being taken
in other countries. The global spread of information has made it difficult to control implementation of that information, yet those who expend energy in creating intellectual property wish to have sovereignty
over it, and are convinced that the world would be a better place if
intellectual property were protected adequately and effectively everywhere. The trade weapon has been a major one. Possible restrictions on
access to the U.S. and European markets can influence other governments in bilateral negotiations to enact or upgrade intellectual property
laws. The United States has in these efforts resorted to section 301 of
the Trade Act and section 337 of the Tariff Act. The European Community has used its system of generalized tariff preferences as a lever
for ensuring that foreign intellectual property laws are not discriminatory. Such efforts have provided major incentives for countries such as
South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Taiwan to respond.
It is to be expected that the aforementioned pressures, and the resort to
the dispute settlement and enforcement provisions of GATT, will be
exercised in the future to ensure that the TRIPs agreement is
implemented.

VII.

DIFFERENCES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS WITHIN
FEDERATIONS

The developments outlined earlier with respect to the EU and the
EEA reflect the easy appreciation that the subject of intellectual property is not one to be left entirely to member nations on the principle of
devolution. This is nothing new. At the time of the American Revolution, the various British colonies had intellectual property laws limited
in their operation to the boundaries of each. To secure effective copyright or patent protection an author or inventor was obliged to comply
with a multitude of colonial laws. When the U.S. Constitution was
written in 1787, it was agreed that the states could not separately make
effectual provision for copyrights and patents, and the Constitution allocated to the federal Congress the jurisdiction "to promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." A similar surrender of provincial and state jurisdictions over
copyrights and patents occurred in the Canadian Constitution of 1867
and in the Australian federation in 1901. I am not aware of any federation in which this principle of federal jurisdiction has not been adopted
with respect to copyright and patent laws, though there may be rest-
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lessness in the Province of Quebec on the question of preserving French
culture.
Trademarks may be protected in more than one way in common
law jurisdictions. In these jurisdictions, rights in trademarks and business names (trade names) arise through use. The trademark or the
name of a small business may be known in only a small locality. Individual states in the U.S. have enacted their own trademark and unfair
competition laws which coexist with the common law. Trademarks and
names may rapidly become known beyond the confines of a state or
province, thereby affecting commerce that is within the competence of
the federal government. For such marks at least, federal trademark legislation has taken its place alongside the common law. In Canada it has
so far been assumed that a trademark may be registered federally even
if its use and reputation does not extend beyond the confines of a single
province. Corporate names are also the subject in Canada of both federal and provincial incorporation statutes but, as in other common law
jurisdictions, are subject to prior trademark rights. Within a federation
there may exist both federal and state or provincial laws relating to
trade secrets and trade practices. There may be different judicial interpretations of laws from one state, circuit or province to another.
Intellectual property laws do not of course govern all matters relating to intellectual property, either within a nation or internationally.
Contractual rights and rights of succession may, under conflict of laws
principles, be determined by resort to more than one national law or,
within a federation, by resort to various state or provincial laws.
Local sovereignties may also be asserted when a nation or union
disintegrates. This has occurred in the former Soviet Union and in the
former Yugoslavia, where intellectual property laws are currently in a
state of flux.

VIII.

TOWARDS UTOPIA?

Sir Thomas Moore's Utopia (which means "no place" in latin)
was an island, primarily agrarian. We now have a global economy, and
having to seek separate national rights or having to enforce rights in
more than one jurisdiction requires a very deep pocket. Advanced technology and communications are rapidly changing the market place. Developing countries are no longer passive bystanders. At the beginning of
this paper, it was noted that in theory intellectual property rights have
no logical boundaries. In today's world a modern utopian ideal would
be a world-wide integrated intellectual property system, with one internationally enforceable patent, one copyright, one trademark, etc., in the
hands of one owner, governed by one set of laws administered centrally
and under a single judicial system. In theory this might be attainable
as existing rights expire, but some vested nonstatutory right in trademarks need never expire, and rights in trade secrets have no fixed term.
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Some steps have been taken towards a theoretical utopia. The establishment of some national intellectual property laws in federations
has been mentioned. The independent Benelux nations have unified
their trademark and industrial design registration systems. Beyond relatively modest examples such as these, however, little progress can be
foreseen in the direction of a completely unified system. A proposed
community patent for the EU would not have eliminated national patents. However, it has run into problems, from constitutional ones in
Ireland and Denmark to more or less serious problems of language,
litigation arrangements, standards for validity, transitional measures
and finance.
In matters of law, ideas of sovereignty may be bound up with lack
of familiarity with other legal systems, with conservatism and untutored arrogance that one's own system is the best. Different traditions
abound among the developed nations. In countries which derive their
legal systems from England, copyright law is oriented towards protection of investment, whereas in Continental Europe the underlying philosophy of copyright is the moral entitlement of authors. At common
law, trademark rights stem from use in the market place; in civil law
countries, they are founded primarily upon registration. In patent law,
there has long been a divergence between countries which insist upon
full practical instructions in a patent specification and those that require only a general description, and between those which insist upon
accurate identification of inventors and those which are content with
identification of owners. Even between such (dare one say) culturally
close neighbors as the United States and Canada there are major differences in substantive intellectual property laws and important differences in the conduct of intellectual property litigation, notable aspects
of which are, to those of modest means, excessive U.S. pre-trial discoveries, trials of complex technical cases by juries, and meticulous probing for evidence of misuse and inequitable or illegal conduct. If Canada
has difficulties with the U.S. litigator's passion for looking under every
stone, how strange that adversarial system must seem in countries accustomed to trial by judges whose training and professional lives have
not been as advocates but as inquisitors. How unsurprising it is that
different conclusions are frequently reached in different countries
where, at least on the surface, the same intellectual property right
seems to be involved. If, as between developed nations, prospects for
unification of laws and procedures, and moving towards a single patent
or other intellectual property right, seem ambitious, how much less attractive such notions must be to those who worry about economic imperialism. Witness the lack of an internationalist attitude in the United
States at the time of its birth, when its population was less than that of
Nicaragua today and its industrial revolution was barely under way.
Intellectual property laws have always been tools of national policy.
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Full integration of laws would require an examination of diverse competition laws, not addressed to a serious extent in this paper but of
great variety under, inter alia, the Treaty of Rome, the U.S. antitrust
laws and the Canadian Competition Act.
It has been noted that even if the laws of two nations are identical
and trade is completely free between them, a trader may have different
rights in one than in another, for he may not have complied with or
have taken full advantage of the laws of one or the other.
If complete unification of intellectual property laws is an unrealistic goal, there may be greater hope for eventual harmonization of laws.
This has been a major objective of WIPO, which seeks not only the
elimination of gross disparities in substantive laws, but also simplification of procedures for obtaining intellectual property rights. It features
a dispute settlement procedure that is an alternative to the vicissitudes
of litigation. However, with the disparity of views and habits that national representatives bring to the negotiating table, consensus has
sometimes been difficult to achieve. Will the major industrial nations,
having made so much headway in the TRIPs negotiations, consider
that they can usefully pursue their interests further in WIPO? The
TRIPs agreement has left some issues open for further negotiations
under GATT, though another full GATT (WTO) extravaganza is not
to be expected for several years at least. The United States is probably
now going to concentrate on expanding NAFTA to include South and
Central American nations which now have weak intellectual property
laws. Developing countries have shown little enthusiasm in WIPO for
upgrading their intellectual property laws. In international negotiations
relating to copyright and trademarks, the United States has been supportive. It has been a major hold-out in WIPO with respect to harmonization of patent laws. Perhaps this has been part of a negotiating
strategy, with room to maneuver if concessions can be wrung from
others on perceived inequities in their systems. So far, however, influential sectors in the United States have opposed a change in U.S. substantive patent laws to the international norm (adopted in Canada)
which, with minor exceptions, determines the right to a patent as of the
date of application. The international norm also accords intervening
rights to prior users, and requires publication of applications that are in
the pipeline. With some justification there is an impression abroad that
the United States, with its labyrinth of laws and procedures, its 301
and 337, is interested primarily in getting others to change their ways.
The impression is that the U.S. is only active where its commerce
stands to benefit.
Conservatism is by no means confined to the United States. As an
example, in a 1977 report to the Canadian government on possible revisions to the copyright law, two Canadian scholars, Keyes and Brunet,
recommended that Canada provide no more benefits to foreigners than
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its international obligations require. A primary reason for this is that,
in different proportions, no country has a majority of the world's authors, and the greater the rights granted to foreigners, the greater the
outflow of payments for copyright works. There is a strong argument
for a country with a relatively small economy to be a follower rather
than a leader in the introduction of new intellectual property rights.
For example, there is afoot in the European Union a proposal to give to
industrial designers an automatic copyright of three years before they
need go to the expense of registering their designs to protect them. Until such a right is available in Europe to Canadian designers, is it not
good economics to withhold making such a right available in Canada to
a far greater number of foreign designers?
So much for unitary laws or harmonization of laws. On the mundane level of administrative procedures considerable progress has been
made in the world of intellectual property. A marked success has been
the Patent Cooperation Treaty under which national Patent Offices,
though not completely bypassed, may be relieved of doing their own
searches for prior art and under which a single examination may be
conducted, leading to separate national patents in numerous countries.
The European Patent Office which may grant a bundle of national patents has also been a success, though it has come under fire for its high
fees, bureaucratic independence, and delays. Nevertheless, one can
rather confidently expect that there will be future successes in diminishing the serious amount of duplication of work that is still required to
obtain protection in several countries.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The developments that have been traced above illustrate three
principal ways in which national sovereignties have diminished in relation to intellectual property rights. The mildest has been at the administrative level to reduce duplication of effort, exemplified by the Patent
Cooperation Treaty, the European Patent Convention, the Hague
Agreement for the registration of designs and the Madrid Agreement
for registering trademarks. Bolder have been the harmonizations of
principles, initiated by the Paris and Berne Conventions of the 1880s,
though leaving to national laws the ways these principles are implemented. The NAFTA and GATT treaties have gone substantially farther along this path. The third and most effective transfer of sovereignty would be to integrate intellectual property systems into one, as
has occurred in limited circumstances exemplified by Benelux arrangements and, more expansively, by the forthcoming system for a European Union trademark. Substantial further developments in that direction may not be imminent outside the EU. But let us stand back. After
all, the Paris and Berne Conventions of the 1880s are but four short
generations old. The past half century has witnessed marvelous U.S.
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leadership in reviving western Europe under the Marshall Plan and in
setting Japan on a new course under General MacArthur's enlightened
administration. There has been a revolution in economic thought in
countries now struggling towards a market economy, though some have
only recently achieved sovereignty. An intellectual property system has
been a characteristic of a vibrant market economy, serving as a powerful stimulus to innovation, investment and trade. History has shown
that, in the right economic environment, with opportunities for good
education and advancement, leadership can emerge anywhere in the
globe. How, then, can anyone be other than optimistic? Though many
developments relating to intellectual property constitute intrusions on
sovereignty, they may better be characterized as gains in international
cooperation.

